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Background: The setting of realistic performance-based financing rewards necessitates not just knowledge of
health workers’ salaries, but of the revenue that accrues from their additional income-generating activities. This
study examined the coping mechanisms of health workers in the public health sector of Nasarawa and Ondo states
in Nigeria to supplement their salaries and benefits; it also estimated the proportionate value of the revenues from
those coping mechanisms in relation to the health workers’ official incomes.
Methods: This study adopted a mixed-methods approach, consisting of semi-structured interviews, a review of
policy documents, a survey using self-administered questionnaires, and the randomized response technique (RRT).
In all, 170 health workers (86 in Ondo, 84 in Nasarawa) participated in the survey. In-depth interviews were
conducted with 24 health workers (12 per state) and nine policy makers from both states.
Results: The health workers perceived their salaries as inadequate, though most policy makers differed in this
assessment. There appeared to be a considerable expenditure–income disparity among the respondents.
Approximately 56% (n = 93) of the study population reported having additional earning arrangements: most
reported non-medical activities such as farming and trading, but private practice was also frequently reported.
Half of the respondents with additional earning arrangements stated that their income from those activities was
the equivalent of half or more of their monthly salaries. Specifically, 35% (n = 32) said that they earned about half of
their official monthly salaries and 15% (n = 14) reported earning the same or more than their monthly salaries from
these activities. Other coping mechanisms used by the health workers included prioritizing activities that enabled
the earning of per diems, collecting informal payments and gifts from patients, and pilfering drugs from facilities.
Conclusions: Predatory and non-predatory mechanisms accounted for the health workers’ additional income. It
may be difficult for the health workers to meet their expenses with their salaries and financial incentives; this
highlights the need for the regulation of additional earnings and to implement targeted accountability
mechanisms. This study indicates the value of using mixed methods when investigating sensitive issues. Future
studies of this type should employ mixed methods for triangulation purposes to provide better insight into health
workers’ responses.
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Significant progress has been made in the Nigerian gov-
ernment’s commitment to the health sector and to policy
development since the reinstitution of democracy in
1999 [1]. However, at approximately 4% of total expendi-
ture, the government expenditure on health [2] still lags
behind the 15% recommended by African leaders at the
Abuja Summit in 2000 [3]. Health-care delivery con-
tinues to be a challenge in Nigeria, and the country is
still not on track to achieve many of the health-related
Millennium Development Goals. Therefore, there is a
need to promote greater progress toward attaining glo-
bal targets.
In Nigeria, as in many other low- and middle-income
countries (LMICs), the poor performance of public
health systems can be attributed to a number of factors.
These range from poor or inadequate funding of the
health sector, shortages in the health workforce, and a
limited capacity in health management within the coun-
try to problems that extend beyond the health sector
[4,5], such as weak governance and poverty among cer-
tain populations.
The Nigeria State Health Investment Project intends
to introduce resource allocation based on results and to
pilot a performance-based financing (PBF) mechanism
in three Nigerian states. Output-based payments, which
are a main strategy in performance-based approaches,
have been employed in several low-income countries,
Rwanda and Burundi being typical examples [6].
A key issue is that the setting of realistic rewards for
health workers in the context of PBF demands know-
ledge about the real income of health workers. This ne-
cessitates knowledge not just of salaries, but also of the
revenue that accrues from additional income-generating
activities. Public salaries in many countries are low, and
though the financial aspect is only one of many that mo-
tivate workers, it is a crucial one [7]. It is known that
health workers’ responses to unfavorable working condi-
tions and inadequate salaries are manifested in the form
of various coping mechanisms to supplement salaries.
Income supplementation by health workers allows them
to live closer to their desired standard of comfort, and it
may have the arguable advantage of keeping qualified
personnel in the public service. These mechanisms may
include the following: moonlighting during work hours,
either through medical work (i.e., private practice) or
non-medical work [7-9]; concentrating on donor-funded
activities that give access to per diems or allowances
[7,8,10]; or the misuse of their positions for misappropri-
ation [7], such as pilfering drugs, which can provide a
substantial means of revenue for health workers when
sold to patients or on the parallel drug market [9,11].
Not all these practices present a conflict of interest or
are illegal, but they do affect the functioning of healthservices. Some predatory mechanisms (such as drug pil-
fering, collecting illegal payments from patients, and
moonlighting activities that divert patients to private
practice) constitute an outright financial barrier to ac-
cess to health-care and reduce public trust; other non-
predatory mechanisms, such as giving priority to per
diem activities, constitute more of a competition for
time [7] and indirectly have a negative impact on access
to care.
Few studies have assessed the value of revenues gained
from such coping strategies. Questions about the coping
strategies of health workers to supplement their income
are sensitive, and it is difficult to obtain truthful answers.
For instance, the misuse of health workers’ access to
drugs though rarely openly acknowledged, is considered
a widespread practice [7]. In a study conducted in
Uganda, the average Ugandan health facility drug leak-
age was found to be as high as 78%, and the resale of
drugs was identified as the single highest income earner
for most units. Both health workers and management
teams were involved in this activity [11]. A study of a
sample of health workers in Mozambique and Cape
Verde confirmed the misuse of access to drugs by health
workers as a major coping strategy [9]. That study found
that different categories of health workers mis-
appropriated drugs in different ways, but that doctors
used the most diverse methods. The study noted a con-
flict in health workers’ self-image that arose in terms of
their perception of what an honest public servant should
be and the difficult living situations they faced, which
made them betray that image. The results also showed
that despite the difficulties health workers faced in many
countries, these illegal acts had not been internalized
as a norm, and that policies resulting in an improve-
ment in the state of affairs would be welcomed by health
personnel.
To improve the existing situation, alternative strategies
to conventional input-based methods may have to be
implemented to improve the performance of the health
sector and to help it achieve its goals. There is a need
for approaches that maximize the use of available re-
sources to achieve increased productivity and quality
performance from the available workforce [6]. One of
the major challenges is the fact that salaries are fixed,
and are not linked to the provision of services; there are
few incentives to motivate health workers to be respon-
sive to the communities for which they provide services
[8]. Indeed, the question of how to structure payments
in the sector to encourage better performance is one
that is currently generating considerable interest [12,13].
PBF schemes have received great attention as an innova-
tive approach to improve the use and quality of health-
care services as well as the efficiency of the health system
in LMICs.
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Nasarawa and Ondo. These states, which were used as
pilots for the institution of PBF, have diverse characteris-
tics in terms of population, number of health workers
and available health worker types.
Nasarawa state
Nasarawa State is in the north central part of Nigeria. It
has a population of approximately 1.9 million and com-
prises 13 local government areas (LGAs). The state has
880 primary health facilities, 19 secondary public health
facilities and two tertiary health facilities [14]. Human
health resources in the public sector consist of 215 doc-
tors, 1021 nurses and midwives, 55 community health
officers (CHOs), and 3365 community health extension
workers (CHEWs) [14].
Ondo state
Ondo State is in the southwestern part of the country. It
has a population of around 3.9 million and is made up
of 18 LGAs [15]. The state has about 800 primary health
facilities, 16 secondary public health facilities, and six
tertiary a health facilities [16]. Human health resources
in the public sector include approximately 60 senior
doctors (consultants), 190 medical officers, 1475 nurses/
midwives, 185 CHOs, and 1152 CHEWs [17]. The pro-
vision of health services in the state is free for pregnant
women and for children aged up to 5 years. The state
implements a national health insurance scheme in 12
LGAs.
This paper presents the results of a baseline study on
income and coping mechanisms of health workers to
supplement their public sector salaries in these two
states, to identify opportunities for rewarding health
workers in the context of PBF. The present study is part
of a wider investigation involving motivation and per-
formance management issues. The focus of the study
presented here was directed at answering the following
specific study questions. What are the opinions of the
health workers regarding their salaries and benefits?
What coping mechanisms are adopted by different types
of health workers—doctors, nurses, CHOs, and CHEWs—
in dealing with income-related issues? What is the propor-
tionate value of the revenues from those coping mecha-
nisms in relation to the health workers’ official income?
What are the opinions of key experts in the ministries of
health and local governments regarding health workers,
and which policies influence their views on salaries and
benefits?
Methods
This was a mixed-method study, which focused on four
critical types of workers in primary and secondaryhealth-care (nurses/midwives, CHOs, and CHEWs) and
secondary and tertiary care (doctors).
Data collection methods
The quantitative aspect was addressed by the use of a
questionnaire made up of the following two components.
Self-administered section on health workers’ compen-
sation - This part of the questionnaire mainly addressed
the health workers’ salaries and their additional sources
of revenue, including the amount generated, their house-
hold expenditure, and satisfaction with their salaries and
living conditions.
The randomized response technique (RRT)b section- The
RRT is a survey methodology that allows respondents
to answer sensitive questions truthfully without invad-
ing their privacy [18]. The RRT explored the different
coping mechanisms of health workers, including the
prioritization of activities that enabled the earning
of per diems, selling drugs to patients, diverting pa-
tients to private practice, and pilfering drugs or sup-
plies from health facilities. This part of the study
included a series of 10 randomized questions: seven
sensitive questions interspersed with three less sensitive
questions.
The qualitative aspect was addressed by means of sec-
ondary data and semi-structured interviews with health
workers and key informants in the health ministries and
local governments. The semi-structured interviews were
carried out in each state with three individuals from
each health worker type. The interviews explored their
perceptions of the adequacy of their salaries and the
need to supplement their income, including their coping
strategies. Semi-structured interviews with key infor-
mants from health ministries and local government
examined the setting of health workers’ salaries, their
satisfaction with their salaries, the need for health
workers to supplement their income, and the various
options open to them in this regard. Secondary data
were obtained from policy documents on salary scales
and setting salaries.
Study population and sampling
LGAs from the two states were purposively selected
using maximum variation sampling based on criteria of
geographic features: LGAs in urban, semi-urban, and
rural areas; and the availability of a mixture of health
facilities with different types of health workers. Two
LGAs were chosen from Ondo State—Akure South
and Ifedore; three were chosen from Nasarawa State—
Nasarawa Eggon, Doma, and Lafia.
The facilities were purposively selected based on the
availability of the required health worker types. Priority
was given to primary health facilities in the selection
of nurses/midwives, CHOs, and CHEWs. Secondary
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of doctors and nurses. In Nasarawa, a tertiary health
facility was also selected to recruit the doctor popula-
tion because of the lack of doctors in the secondary
facilities.
In all, 170 health workers (86 and 84 health workers
from Ondo and Nasarawa, respectively) were recrui-
ted for the study; however, the data for only 165 were
analyzed. Five incomplete questionnaires were exclu-
ded. The mixture of health worker types varied slightly
between the two states: there were 21 doctors, 22
nurses/midwives, 22 CHOs, and 21 CHEWS from
Ondo compared with 20 doctors, 22 nurses/midwives,
20 CHOs, and 22 CHEWs in Nasarawa. Random sys-
tematic sampling was carried out to recruit all health
worker types with the exception of CHOs in Ondo
and doctors in Nasarawa. Convenience sampling was
conducted for the latter two health worker types
owing to their limited numbers. The study recruited
all health workers who were available at the facilities,
whereas those away on study leave or who were ab-
sent through illness were excluded. The response
characteristics of the study participants are detailed in
Table 1.
For the qualitative component, 24 health workers
(12 in each state) were selected from the respondents
using maximum variation sampling, based on the type
of health worker (three individuals per type) and years of
work experience (less than 5 years and 5 years or more).
The health workers were based at six health facilities in
Ondo and nine facilities in Nasarawa.
Nine policy makers from ministries of health and local
government were also selected for interviews. They in-
cluded the following: a health commissioner, four direc-
tors of primary health-care of the LGAs selected for the
study, one permanent secretary of health, a chief medical
director of a specialist hospital, and a director and dep-
uty director at the ministries of health.Table 1 Response characteristics of study participants
(n = 165)
Response characteristic Nasarawa Ondo
N % N %
Total recruited 84 - 86 -
Responded 80 95.2a 85 98.8a
Non-Reticent by standard criteria* 76 95.0 69 81.2
Non-Reticent by modified criteria** 41 51.3 28 32.9
In-depth interviews 12 - 12 -
* After excluding participants answering ‘No’ to at least all six sensitive
questions in the RRQ and ‘Yes’ to one or more of the less sensitive questions
(questions 1, 2, and 10) or question no. 3, which was also perceived as being
less sensitive.
** After excluding those responding ‘No’ to five or more questions in the RRQ.
a Out of total recruited.Data analysis
Quantitative analysis
Quantitative data were entered using SPSS version 19
software and checked for consistency using frequency
distribution and manual checking. Data were then cleaned
by referring back to the original questionnaires. Standard
descriptive statistical methodologies were used to capture
the socio-demographic and household characteristics, sal-
ary and other incentives, and additional earning arrange-
ments. Comparisons among states and health worker
categories were made using chi-square tests and non-
parametric tests as appropriate.
Process and analysis of randomized response questionnaire
(RRQ)
The RRQ was used to identify the reticent respondents.
The process is as follows. The participants are instructed
to toss a coin at each question and answer depending on
the results of the coin toss. If the participant obtains
heads, the question is answered as yes, irrespective of
the answer the participant would actually give. If the
participant obtains tails, the question is answered hon-
estly. The number of yes answers obtained per question
therefore consists of those who obtained heads after
tossing the coin and those who answered yes to en-
gaging in sensitive behavior when landing tails in the
coin toss. Assuming the proportion of participants
obtaining heads at the coin toss to be 0.5, the proportion
of participants in the sample actually engaging in sensi-
tive behavior (P) is given by the following:
P ¼ 2PY–1
where PY is the proportion of participants answering yes
to the particular sensitive question.
Identification of reticent respondents in the RRQ
The additional earning strategies assumed to be prac-
ticed by health workers include behavior and strategies
that are considered unethical or unacceptable by societal
standards. Therefore, there was a high possibility that
participants would be reluctant to reveal these practices.
The RRQ was thus used to address this issue. The RRQ
was expected to achieve two objectives:
1. Encourage candor on the part of participants when
answering questions regarding sensitive behavior by
means of the coin-toss method.
2. Identify possible participant reticence using a
combination of sensitive and less sensitive questions.
Questions 1, 2, and 10 were less sensitive questions,
and they were included to identify reticence in the sam-
ple. It was assumed that reticent participants would
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occur with the coin-toss method. Alternatively, it was
supposed that reticent participants would answer yes
to only the less sensitive questions (1, 2, and 10) and
answer no to all the sensitive questions. Hence, it was
assumed that reticent respondents could be identified
by examining the pattern in answering the questions.
A close examination of the answering pattern showed
that question 3 (“I give priority to job activities that
will enable me to earn per diems”) was also perceived
as relatively less sensitive by the participants. There-
fore, in the analysis of the RRQ, “possibly reticent”
participants were excluded. The reticent participants
were initially defined as follows:
-Participants answering no to all questions (it was
noted that this group may either not have understood
the process or did not take it seriously; three participants
were excluded based on this criterion).
-Participants answering yes to only one question and
no to all other questions.
-Participants answering no to all six sensitive ques-
tions and yes to one or more of the less sensitive ques-
tions (questions 1, 2, and 10) or the relatively less
sensitive question 3.
Once reticent subjects were excluded, the sample
consisted of 145 subjects. However, analysis of these
subjects resulted in many unrealistic percentages, show-
ing that a high degree of reticence remained within the
sample. The criteria for reticence were then expanded.
For the purposes of this study, reticent participants were
defined as those who answered no to five or more ques-
tions. Once reticent subjects were excluded, the sample
consisted of 69 subjects. These non-reticent subjects
were then analyzed.Qualitative analysis
A combined technique of deductive and inductive ana-
lysis was carried out. Transcripts were read and coded,
and data were manually extracted using a data analysis
matrix. This matrix consisted of columns with pre-
identified codes according to the research objectives
and themes of the interview guide. During the coding
of the transcripts and the data extraction, new themes
emerged, which were added to the data analysis mat-
rix. Subsequently, answers from the two states and
from the different types of health workers were com-
pared and contrasted. This was first done individually
and the team then discussed their findings and com-
pared their analysis, reflecting on the findings. The
states and health worker types were analyzed toge-
ther and separately to enable the identification of
both similarities and differences in terms of views and
experience.Ethical considerations and quality assurance
This study was ethically approved by the National Pri-
mary Health Care Development Agency, Nigeria. In-
formed consent was obtained before administering the
questionnaires and conducting the interviews. Participa-
tion was on a voluntary basis. Only the study teams had
access to the collected data, and in the reporting all links
to individuals or facilities were removed.
In view of the sensitive nature of the study subject
matter, in that it explored some predatory and illegal
practices among health workers, a variety of methods
and sources were used to allow triangulation of the in-
formation: semi-structured interviews, self-administered
questionnaires, and a RRT. The RRT specifically aimed
to identify reticent respondents. Different types of health
workers and different policy makers were interviewed.
Results
Socio-demographic characteristics of respondents
Both states had a predominantly experienced workforce,
with only about 19% (n = 32) of the respondents having
work experience of 5 years or less. Of the study popula-
tion, 66% (n = 108) were female, and most (83%, n = 137)
of the respondents were married. Approximately 46%
(n = 75) of the respondents worked in rural areas while
18% (n = 29) worked in semi-urban areas. The majority
(69%; n = 114) worked in primary health facilities. Details
of the proportion of respondents from the two states
and the facilities as well as the basic socio-demographic
characteristics of the sample are presented in Table 2.
For the qualitative study, 24 respondents from the four
types of health workers were interviewed from both
Nasarawa and Ondo. Three health workers from each
type were interviewed in each state. Nurses/midwives,
CHOs, and CHEWs were predominantly female (n = 17)
and the doctors were predominantly male (n = 4). Al-
most all the health workers were married, and 17 de-
scribed themselves as being the main income earners in
their households. Three health professionals had less
than 5 years’ work experience; the remainder had experi-
ence ranging from 5 to 32 years.
Official remuneration of health workers and its adequacy
Salary structures for health workers in Nigeria are known
as CONMESS (consolidated medical salary structure) for
medical and dental professionals and CONHESS (consoli-
dated health salary structure) for other health profes-
sionals, including nurses/midwives, CHOs, and CHEWs.
Adoption of the salary structure varied in the two
states: Nasarawa had 100% implementation of CONMESS
and CONHESS, whereas in Ondo the take-up rate was ap-
proximately 80%. Nigeria has a vastly decentralized go-
vernment structure, which consists of three tiers—federal,
state, and local governments. This decentralization gives
Table 2 Basic socio-demographic and work-related characteristics of the sample according to state
Characteristic Nasarawa Ondo Total
n % n % n %
Setting Urban 19 23.8 42 49.4 61 37
Rural 56 70.0 19 22.4 75 45.5
Semi urban 5 6.3 24 28.2 29 17.6
Type of facility Basic health clinic 53 66.3 30 35.3 83 50.3
Comprehensive primary health clinic 0 0 25 29.4 25 15.2
Model primary health clinic 5 6.3 1 1.2 6 3.6
General / Secondary hospital 3 3.8 28 32.9 31 18.8
Tertiary hospital 19 23.8 1 1.2 20 12.1
Work experience 5 years or less 19 23.8 13 15.3 32 19.4
6 – 10 years 17 21.3 11 12.9 28 17.0
11 – 15 years 14 17.5 14 16.5 28 17.0
16 – 20 years 16 20.0 14 16.5 30 18.2
21 – 25 years 10 12.5 5 5.9 15 9.1
>25 years 4 4.9 28 33.0 32 19.4
Gender Female 41 51.3 67 78.8 108 65.5
Male 39 48.8 18 21.2 57 34.5
Marital status Single 15 18.8 6 7.1 21 12.7
Married 61 76.3 76 89.4 137 83.0
Other* 4 5.1 3 3.5 7 4.2
Total 80 100 85 100 165 100
Table 3 Gross salaries of the different health worker
types in the two states at Grade Level 10, Step 1
Cadres Nasarawa Ondo
NGN *USD NGN *USD
Doctors 212722.00 1350.00 176113.00 1116.00
Nurses/midwives 157846.00 1001.00 126641.00 803.00
CHOs 157846.00 1001.00 126641.00 803.00
CHEWs 157846.00 1001.00 126641.00 803.00
NGN: Nigeria Naira.
*USD: US dollars (Current exchange value of 1 USD is approximately
157.57 NGN).
Entry point into public service for Doctors: CONMESS 10; Nurses/Midwives and
CHEWs: 06; CHOs: 07.
Deductions vary, hence net pay varies.
Data on net pay, which would have been preferable, could not be obtained as
most health workers did not receive pay slips and were not clear about their
net pay.
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cide what percentage of the salary scale (decided at the
federal level) they are able to pay.
A comparison of the salary structure in the two states
appears in Table 3, which indicates the implemented
CONMESS/CONHESS of the health workers at Grade
level (GL) 10, step 1, on the scales. The salaries in
Table 3 are presented as combined figures that include
all benefits and allowances, such as transport, housing,
and rural hardship and hazard allowances. The figures
also include duty allowances for doctors and shift duty
allowances for the other health worker types.
The pay is low compared with that of health pro-
fessionals in most developed countries; for example,
according to the World Health Organization, in terms of
purchasing power parity, Nigerian doctors earn about
25% of what they would earn working in Europe, North
America, or the Middle East [19]. However, health wor-
kers are considered to be much better paid than other
public servants in Nigeria. As an example, a medical
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has a gross monthly salary of approximately 180,000 naira,
whereas a public servant in another sector on GL 10 step
1 of the enhanced public service salary structure earns a
gross salary of around 50,000 naira.
The wage compression ratios for health workers in the
two states are within standard limits. Compression is
said to occur when there is a small differential in salaries
between workers regardless of their skills and expe-
rience. Wage compression is calculated as the ratio
between the highest and lowest income earners. An ac-
ceptable compression ratio by international standards
ranges from 6:1 to 7:1 [20]. However, the appropriate-
ness of these figures depends largely on what is po-
litically and constitutionally acceptable in a particular
country and what is generally considered socially equit-
able [20]. The wage compression ratios calculated with
the implemented CONHESS scale were 6.9:1 and 6.6:1
in Nasarawa and Ondo, respectively.
The majority of the health workers in the survey did
not consider their salaries adequate. Of the 165 health
workers, only 22 (13%) were satisfied with their salaries
and benefits. An analysis by state and health worker type
did not reveal any significant difference in satisfaction
levels. All interviewed health workers answered that
their salaries were important to provide for their (ex-
tended) families. However, health workers also stated
that their salaries were insufficient and therefore ad-
ditional sources of income were required. Additional in-
come was also perceived as necessary because of societal
pressure: relatives of health workers usually have high
expectations of them. Two respondents in Nasarawa
stated that they were required to look after relatives be-
cause of their status as health workers: “Whether you
like it or not, society always expects a great deal from
you, and the fact that society now worships wealth
means that you are constantly under that pressure. And
if you are not getting what you think is a fair deal from
your employers, the onus is now on you; otherwise,




n % n % n
20 or less 59 35.8 61 37.0 117
21–50 68 41.2 39 23.6 37
51–100 25 15.2 34 20.6 5
Above 100 5 3.0 27 16.4 3
Missing 8 4.8 4 2.4 3
Total 165 100 165 100 165
*Education refers to termly school fees paid in September. Health workers were ask
#Utilities include water, electricity, fuel for generators, recharge cards for cell phoneHowever, the policy makers differed in their opinion.
Most key informants (five of nine) interviewed believed
that the salary was adequate for the health workers.
Many stated that increasing salaries would only motivate
staff for a short period and that they would never be sa-
tisfied: “Well, to a large extent human beings are insati-
able. There is no amount that you can pay somebody
such that they would not want to do something else”
(key informant, Ondo).
The household expenditure pattern was assessed in rela-
tion to the household size. The number of people living in
the households of the participants ranged from 1 to 23
with a median of 6 (IQR 4–8). Six or more people were
reported to live in 56.9% (n = 94) of the households. The
total monthly expenditure of the households ranged from
21,000 to 4,245,000 naira, c with a median of 190,000
(interquartile range [IQR] 114,600–346,000) naira. The
per capita household expenditure ranged from 3,287 to
707,500 naira. The median per capita household expendi-
ture was 35,000 (IQR 20,607–66,267) naira. Of the health
workers, 73 (44%) had spouses with full-time employment.
There was considerable disparity between the health
workers’ salaries and their household expenditure. The
total household expenditure was remarkably high com-
pared with the salaries of the health workers. For ap-
proximately 38% (n = 62) of the respondents it was
between 101% and 200% of their salaries, and for 20%
(n = 33), it was 200%–500% (Details are in Additional
file 1: Table S1). From the pattern of household expend-
iture, it was evident that this asymmetry between expend-
iture and income occurred mainly in terms of household
feeding, school fees for children, and in the proportion of
income spent on dependents (extended family members).
It was found that 15% and 21% of the health workers
spent 51%–100% of their salaries on food and education,
respectively; 3% and 16% spent over 100% on these items.
For dependents, 22% of the health workers spent
21%–50% of their salaries. Details of the household
expenditure of respondents as a proportion of their
salaries are shown in Table 4.ressed as a percentage of the respondent’s salary
nts Rent #Utilities Transport
% n % n % n %
71.0 151 91.5 130 78.8 142 86.1
22.4 6 3.7 26 15.8 14 8.5
3.0 3 1.8 5 3.0 4 2.4
1.8 2 1.2 2 1.2 0 0.0
1.8 3 1.8 2 1.2 5 3.0
100 165 100 165 100 165 100
ed for their previous month’s expenditure (data were collected in October).
s (communication).
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This section focuses on the three types of additional
earning arrangements explored in the study: medical,
non-medical, and selling drugs. The results obtained
from the compensation questionnaire used in the survey
and the in-depth interviews of both health workers and
policy makers are presented first, followed by the find-
ings from the RRT.
Medical and non-medical additional earning
arrangements
Of the 165 respondents in the survey, 93 (56.4%) indi-
cated that they had medical or non-medical additional
earning arrangements. The majority (n = 70, 42.4%) re-
ported non-medical activities, such as farming and tra-
ding. Table 5 shows further details of the different types
of additional earning arrangements practiced by partici-
pants. Table 6 presents details regarding the time spent
on additional earning arrangements and the income gen-
erated. Nearly 45% (n = 41) of the respondents that had
medical and non-medical additional earning arrange-
ments stated that they spent between 3 to 5 hours a day
on such activities. Approximately 21% (n = 19) reported
that they spent 3–4 days a week and an additional 35%
(n = 32) reported spending 5 or more days a week on
these activities. Thirty-five percent (n = 32) of respon-
dents with additional arrangements said that they earned
the equivalent of half of their official monthly salaries
and an additional 15% (n = 14) reported earning the
same or more than their monthly salaries from these ac-
tivities. The remainder (41%; n = 38) reported earning
less than half their monthly salaries from their additional
earning arrangements. However, comparing the reported
additional incomes with the amount of time reportedlyTable 5 Prevalence of medical and non-medical
additional earning arrangements in the sample of
health workers (n = 165)





Not practicing any additional earning
arrangement
72 43.6
Private practice, after normal working hours 34 20.6
Private practice, during working hours 07 4.2
Private practice, on call service 20 12.1
Private practice, baby delivery at home 13 7.9
Non-medical business (farming and trading) 70 42.4
Other activities* 01 0.6
All with one or more additional earning
arrangement(s)
93 56.4
* HIV treatment and prevention project.
aPrevalence is expressed as a percentage of the total sample of 165
health workers.
Note: some of the respondents reported more than one of these activities.spent on such activities suggests that the additional in-
come reported may have been underestimated.
There was a significant difference (p = 0.000) between
the two states in the additional earning arrangements
undertaken by the study population. About 74% (n = 59)
of respondents from Nasarawa reported medical and
non-medical additional earning arrangements compared
with 40% (n = 34) from Ondo. The CHOs in Nasarawa
reported the highest level of such activities (100%; n =
20), whereas the doctors in Ondo reported the least
(29%, n = 6). Details of the number of health workers in
the different professional types and their medical and
non-medical additional earning arrangements appear in
Table 7.
The findings from the qualitative aspect of the study
provide some insight into these results. During the inter-
views, respondents from Ondo answered that health wor-
kers should not engage in outside health-related business,
as this could be perceived as stealing. In Nasarawa, res-
pondents regarded health-related private practice as more
acceptable. Three individuals mentioned that especially
for doctors and midwives (1x), private practice was a lu-
crative source of additional income, and one person de-
clared that selling drugs was also very profitable. The
reason for this difference in perception may be partly
explained by the view expressed by one of the key infor-
mants from Nasarawa about private practice: “I think it’s a
good thing because we have advocated that if you are a
midwife and are off-duty, you can assist in other areas—
go to private health clinics and assist there because we
have manpower problems. Both government and private
facilities suffer from this problem. So if such people can
use their time more to assist others, it will improve child
delivery” (key informant, Nasarawa).
Nasarawa is perceived as suffering a greater shortage
of health workers than Ondo, and the impression is that
some illegal practices may be overlooked if health
workers’ activities help solve the health needs of the
populace. However, of all the respondents interviewed,
only one from Nasarawa, a CHO, reported having a pri-
vate practice. Others in the two states answered that
they prescribed for and treated people at home; however,
they were not always explicit about whether or not they
charged for treatment. Some respondents gave the im-
pression that they did not charge but sometimes re-
ceived gifts from patients: “When I am at home, people
come, but I just write prescriptions for small drugs like
Panadol, Flagyl, and malaria drugs, and they go and buy
them outside. You see, it’s my contribution. In fact, be-
cause of this, I get things from people for free because
they appreciate what I am doing. For instance, somebody
has said she will buy clothes for my baby when it’s born.
So that’s what I get—good things from people” (CHO,
Nasarawa).
Table 6 Characteristics of medical and non-medical additional earning arrangements by state
Characteristics Total Nasarawa Ondo
n % n % n %
No. of hours (per day) spent on additional earning
1 – 2 hours 39 42.4 26 44.8 13 38.2
3 – 5 hours 41 44.5 25 43.1 16 47.1
>5 hours 10 10.9 6 10.3 4 11.8
Not stated 02 2.2 1 1.7 1 2.9
No. of days (per week) spent on additional earning
1 – 2 days 40 43.4 28 48.3 12 20.7
3 – 4 days 19 20.7 12 20.7 7 12.1
≥5 days 32 34.8 17 29.3 15 25.9
Not stated 01 1.1 1 1.7 0 0.0
Amount earned from additional arrangements
Less than half the monthly salary 38 41.3 2 36.2 17 50.0
About half the monthly salary 32 34.8 2 36.2 11 32.4
Same as monthly salary 09 9.8 7 12.1 2 5.9
More than the monthly salary 05 5.4 3 5.2 2 5.9
Not specified 08 8.7 6 10.3 2 5.9
Total 92 100.0 58 100 34 100
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tients for free and received only gifts in return, the dy-
namics of this practice—especially in terms of the level
of obligation felt by the patients to give gifts—remain
unclear. It is likely that some respondents did not con-
sider treating patients at home as private practice.
In Nasarawa, respondents answered that visiting pa-
tients at home or treating them in the health workers’
homes might include assisting in deliveries. In Nasarawa,
home deliveries appeared to be generally accepted both
by the community and by health workers. Patients some-
times made payments for these deliveries, and they were
reportedly cheaper than the costs incurred in health
facilities. However, this was not the case in Ondo, as
deliveries there are free in hospitals. It even appeared
that there were quite strong opinions against assisting inTable 7 Comparison of additional earning arrangements
according to health worker type between the two states
Cadre Nasarawa Ondo Significancea
Total n % Total n %
CHEW 22 15 68.2 23 12 52.2 NSb
CHO 20 20 100 21 8 38.1 0.001
N/M 21 17 81 20 8 40 0.007
Doctor 17 7 41.2 21 6 28.6 NS
All cadres 80 59 74 85 34 40 0.000
Note: Some of the health workers have more than one coping strategy.
a Chi-square test.
b NS – Not statistically significant at p = 0.05.deliveries at home, and that this was only acceptable in
the case of real need:
I: “What about home deliveries?”
R: “No. It is risky. They don’t do it. No, no, no—very,
very risky. We advise pregnant mothers to come to
the health facility; we don’t deliver them at home”
(CHO, Ondo).
In Ondo, respondents were more explicit about the
fact that private practice for the health workers (except
doctors) was often forbidden—in both states, private
practice is legal outside official working hours for doc-
tors in public service. However, a key informant in Ondo
stated that private practice was not practiced so much in
the state because of free health-care at local government
and state levels.
Selling drugs as an additional earning arrangement
Selling drugs to patients as an additional earning ar-
rangement was explored in the survey. Given the sen-
sitive nature of this behavior, the participants were
questioned both directly (asking respondents about their
activities) and indirectly (asking about the activities of
others) with regard to this practice. With indirect ques-
tioning, 30% (n = 50) of the respondents stated that
other health workers at their workplace sell drugs to
patients; the median estimated monthly amount earned
was 75,000 (IQR 30,000–100,000) naira. When questioned
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http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/13/387directly on this practice, only 15% (n = 25) admitted to
selling drugs to patients. The reported monthly amount
earned from this practice was much lower than the earn-
ing estimated by their colleagues, with a median of 9,000
(IQR 3,000–20,000) naira. Thus, it is likely that the re-
ported figures were underestimated. Additional file 1:
Table S2 shows the reported amounts earned by the
health workers from selling drugs as an additional
arrangement.
Respondents mostly—more so in Ondo than in
Nasarawa—answered that they knew of colleagues, or
had heard of others, who ran private practices and sold
drugs, but that they had no further details. Most respon-
dents (seven of 12 in Nasarawa, six of 12 in Ondo, and
four of nine key informants) confirmed that illegal prac-
tices took place at work. These mainly involved referring
patients to their own clinic and asking for additional
money from patients or selling drugs. However, often
respondents answered the questions in terms of the
practices taking place at “other facilities” or “the facil-
ity where I used to work,” and they denied that such
practices occurred in the facility where they currently
worked.
When asked about drug revolving funds (DRFs) in the
facilities and how they worked, key informants in
Nasarawa stated that DRFs did not exist in state facil-
ities. The implication was that drugs were not always
available in the facilities and had to be purchased by the
patients from other places, thereby creating opportun-
ities for health workers that sell drugs. However, in
Ondo, key informants answered that some facilities had
DRFs, especially those that operated under the national
health insurance scheme.
When asked about rules and regulations in place to
control illegal practices, the key informants agreed that
there were punitive measures, such as warnings or dis-
missals, if the health workers did not comply with the
rules and regulations about private practice. However,
these measures were not known to all health workers
and did not seem to be implemented in the same way by
all the actors: “If you abandon your duty and go into
private (practice) and we find out, we give you three
warnings. If you repeat the practice, we terminate your
appointment” (key informant, Nasarawa). “There are
rules; the staff regulation says that if you steal, you will
be dismissed. That is clear” (key informant, Ondo).
Reticence in declaring coping mechanisms
The RRT results (Table 8) indicate that most respon-
dents were reticent about their coping strategies to sup-
plement their income. Of the 165 respondents, 96 (58%)
were identified as reticent and were excluded from
the RRT analysis. In all, 69 (42%) health workers in
the sample were identified as “non-reticent” or candidabout their coping strategies to supplement income.
Reticence was observed to a greater degree in the
Ondo sample (59.4%, n = 57) than in the Nasarawa
sample (40.6%, n = 39).
The RRT identified three main coping mechanisms
that were regularly used. Giving priority to activities that
enabled the earning of per diems was the most com-
monly expressed sensitive earning behavior; it was prac-
ticed by 56% of respondents (p = 0.000). The other two
significant findings were predatory strategies: they in-
volved pilfering drugs from facilities, practiced by 33% of
the respondents (p = 0.008), and accepting informal
payments and gifts from patients in return for priority
treatment, which was also practiced by 33% of respon-
dents (p = 0.008). These findings confirm the results
from the qualitative data. In addition, approximately 30%
(p = 0.016) of the respondents reported making more
money from supplementary sources than from their
salary; this result suggests that health workers who
reported earning the equivalent of up to half of their salar-
ies through additional earning arrangements may have
underreported that source of income. This is supported by
the disparity between the salary and household expend-
iture of the health workers. It would appear that this dif-
ference in income–expenditure can be accounted for by a
higher level of supplementary income than was actually
reported by health workers. Tables 9 and 10 provide a syn-
thesis of the estimates on these supplementary income
sources based on the various information sources ob-
tained in this study. The tables detail the range of income
reported by the health workers from their additional
medical and non-medical arrangements as well as
selling drugs. A combination of these with their offi-
cial salaries resulted in their reported real income.
The tables also detail the deficit between the reported
real income and the expenditure of the health workers;
thus, they estimate the level of supplementary income that
may not have been reported by the respondents. The
spousal support reported by some of the respondents was
also taken into consideration to enable great accuracy in
these estimates.
An initial analysis of the RRT data used less restrictive
criteria for reticence, and this allowed the behavior of
the various types of health workers to be examined.
After reticent subjects were excluded, the sample con-
sisted of 145 subjects. When analyzed by type, nurses/
midwives (25.8%, p = 0.03), CHOs (50%, p = 0.00), and
CHEWs (59%, p = 0.00) prioritized activities that allowed
the earning of per diems. Doctors appeared to obtain
more income from supplementary sources than from
their salaries (23.6%, p = 0.05). Significantly more CHEWs
(7.6%, p = 0.05) reported accepting money and gifts from
patients in return for priority treatment, whereas taking
drugs and supplies from facilities to treat patients in
Table 8 Analysis of the RRT after excluding possible reticent participants (n = 69)
Question**
Ondo (n = 28) Nasarawa (n = 41) Total non-reticent (n = 69)
% ‘Yes’ % Practice* P value % ‘Yes’ % Practice* P value % ‘Yes’ % Practice* P value
RR1: I sometimes give priority to my
relatives when I am treating hospital patients. 58.5 50.0 (31.5–68.5) 0.014 80.5 61.0 (46.1–75.9) 0.000 78.3 56.6 (44.9–68.3) 0.000
RR2: I have enough drugs and equipment to
do my work. 75.0 50.0 (31.5–68.5) 0.014 73.2 46.4 (31.1–61.7) 0.005 73.9 47.8 (36.0–59.6) 0.000
RR3: I give priority to my job activities that will
enable me earn per-diems.
75.0 57.2 (38.9–75.5) 0.005 78.0 56 (40.8–71.2) 0.001 78.3 56.6 (44.9–68.3) 0.000
RR4: I sometimes go to a patient’s home to treat
them for a fee.
46.4 7.2 (16.8–2.4) 0.850 58.5 17.0 (5.5–28.5) 0.349 53.6 7.2 (1.1–13.3) 0.630
RR5: I make more money from my supplementary
sources than from my salary.
67.9 35.8 (18.0–53.6) 0.089 63.4 26.8 (13.2–40.4) 0.118 65.2 30.4 (19.5–41.3) 0.016
RR6: I sometimes accept money or gifts from
patients to give them priority treatment.
57.1 14.2 (1.3–27.1) 0.571 73.2 46.4 (31.1–61.7) 0.005 66.7 33.4 (22.3–44.5) 0.008
RR7: I have referred patients from the public
hospital to my private practice.
53.6 7.2 (2.4–16.8) 0.850 61.0 22.0 (9.3–34.7) 0.212 58 16.0 (7.3–24.7) 0.229
RR8: I have taken drugs and supplies from the
hospital to help my patients at my private practice.
64.3 28.6 (11.9–45.3) 0.186 68.3 36.6 (21.9–51.3) 0.029 66.7 33.4 (22.3–44.5) 0.008
RR9: I sometimes have to leave some hours early
from work to do my business.
64.3 28.6 (11.9–45.3) 0.186 53.7 7.4 (0.6–15.4) 0.755 58 16.0 (7.3–24.7) 0.229
RR10: I am sometimes one hour late to work. 71.4 42.8 (24.5–61.1) 0.038 58.5 17.0 (5.5–28.5) 0.349 63.6 27.6 (17.1–38.1) 0.03
* 2 × Percentage(Y) – 100 (95% confidence interval is shown in parentheses).






















Table 9 Revenues reported by health workers with additional income arrangements in Nasarawa
CADRES CHEW CHO N/M DOC
Level of reticence* R Non-R R Non-R R Non-R R Non-R
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Table 10 Revenues reported by health workers with additional income arrangements in Ondo
CADRES CHEW CHO N/M DOC
Level of reticence* R Non-R R Non-R R Non-R R Non-R
















Range of income from selling drugs (NGN) 0 0 0 0 0 0 50,000–56,000
(Av: 53,000)
0
Range of deficit between real income and










Range of deficit between real income and
expenditure (Without spousal support) (NGN)
40,500–386,433
(Av: 188,383)




No deficit No deficit
*Reticence is determined by the modified criteria.
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http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/13/387private practice was a significant result only for CHOs
(16.6%, p = 0.05).
Nurses/midwives showed the greatest reticence (34%,
n = 32), whereas CHOs showed the least (20%, n = 19).
These differences among health worker type were statis-
tically significant (p < 0.05). This difference in the distri-
bution of reticence could be a possible reason for the
differences observed in additional earning arrangements
among states and health worker types. The sensitive
coping strategies of the various types of health workers
as assessed using the RRT are shown in Additional file 1:
Table S3.
Discussion
The study explored the official remunerations of health
workers in Nigeria and the opinions of health workers
and policy makers about its adequacy to maintain a rea-
sonable standard of living. A disparity in views was
found between the two groups. Health workers’ house-
hold expenditure patterns were also examined along
with their coping strategies; the results offer valuable
insight into the dynamics of such workers’ responses to
income-related issues in the two Nigerian states where
the investigation took place. Revenues from the health
workers’ coping mechanisms were estimated, and in
combination with expenditure patterns, these provided
some insight into the real income of health workers.
Within the context of the Nigerian public service, the
official remuneration of health workers is regarded as fa-
vorable, as they are considered the best-paid civil ser-
vants. For example, doctors earn more than three times
the salaries of their counterparts in the public service. In
their study on the adequacy of health workers’ salaries in
Ghana, Witter et al. [21] showed that health workers’
salaries were better than those of general civil service
employees. This is in keeping with the findings of Bowie
et al. [22] in their study in Malawi, where they deter-
mined that the salaries of health workers were 52%
higher than their counterparts in the public service.
The health workers in the study population held differ-
ing opinions about the adequacy of their wages. Most
workers considered their salaries insufficient, and the
level of dissatisfaction with their salaries and benefits
was notably at variance with the views of key informants;
this disparity may be the result of societal perceptions of
the health workers’ privileged position. It also became
clear that irrespective of whether CONMESS and
CONHESS were implemented at 100% or 80% of the
federal scale, the level of dissatisfaction among the
health workers in the study populations was similar. The
prime issue with regard to dissatisfaction thus may
not be related to salary level. The expenditure–in-
come asymmetry observed in this study demands clo-
ser scrutiny—especially with regard to the proportionof the health workers’ income reportedly spent on
household feeding, children’s school fees, and on other de-
pendents. Spousal support, which was reported by a num-
ber of respondents, cannot be discounted: 44% (n = 73) of
the health workers had spouses in full-time employment.
However, the expenditure–income disparity may explain
the general level of dissatisfaction that the health workers
felt with regard to their general living conditions.
A key role of personal income is to cater for the needs
of one’s family—whether nuclear or extended. For the
majority of health workers in this study, household feed-
ing accounted for a considerable portion of their salaries,
with almost 20% of them spending more than half of
their salaries in that area. This finding may be explained
by the relatively large sizes of some of the households
surveyed and, of course, the cost of living in Nigeria.
The value the respondents placed on their extended
families was evident in the proportion of the health
workers’ salaries assigned to this area. Over 20% of re-
spondents apportioned between 21% and 50% of their
salaries to their dependents. The perceived pressure on
the part of the health workers became clear in the inter-
views. The extended family culture is deeply embedded
in African society, and the attendant obligations are
widely embraced and rarely questioned. However, in
addition to the extended family culture, the high social
expectations of health workers—as a result of the per-
ceived prestigious nature of their jobs—may further
complicate this spending pattern. There is a lack of re-
search in this area, and so it would be interesting to
compare the expenditure pattern of health workers with
that of public servants in other sectors.
Examining the expenditure patterns of health workers
in this study provided some insight into what drives
them to supplement their income despite receiving sal-
ary increases. Given health workers’ perceived needs, it
is clear that the salary and allowances earned in the pub-
lic health sector are insufficient. This may remain the
case irrespective of increases in salary and allowances. It
is therefore difficult—if not impossible—to prevent these
workers from making additional earning arrangements.
Consequently, it is necessary to regulate those activities.
The main option could be properly designed account-
ability mechanisms to regulate the amount of time spent
on non-predatory activities, and thus ensure that they
do not conflict with official work. This would be in line
with the findings of Bowie et al. [22], who determined
that health workers’ basic salaries in Malawi were insuf-
ficient to reduce the incentive to make additional ear-
ning arrangements. Similarly, in their Tanzanian study,
Stringhini et al. [23] found that despite a salary increase
of 70% for doctors and 30% for nurses, health workers
still considered their salaries inadequate in terms of their
needs and workload.
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by means of mixed methods became evident in this study.
The RRT was used to identify and remove the reticent
group in the study population, and it enabled an analysis
of participants who were more candid about their coping
mechanisms to supplement their incomes. By means of
the RRT, both non-predatory and predatory activities were
clearly identified as reported by the non-reticent res-
pondents. In both states, giving priority to activities that
enabled the earning of per diems emerged as the most
prevalent coping mechanism; however, the information
from the survey and interviews indicated that there may
not be many opportunities for this to take place. Predatory
mechanisms, such as accepting money or gifts from pa-
tients in return for priority treatment and stealing drugs
and supplies from facilities to treat private patients, were
also significant findings in this study. These findings are in
line with those of Macpake et al. [11] in their study of cop-
ing strategies among health workers in Uganda, where
drug leakage was a major source of revenue for health
workers and their managers. Similarly, Stringhini et al.
[23] found informal payments collected from patients to
be an important source of income for health workers. In
the present study, the ability to make more than one’s offi-
cial salary from supplementary sources was also a signifi-
cant finding among non-reticent health workers. This
finding is in line with that in a study cited by Van
Leberghe et al. [7], in which additional earning arrange-
ments more than doubled the median income of health
managers. This result further stresses the value of extra
earning arrangements in allowing health workers to live
close to their desired level of comfort. The implication of
additional income earning activities in PBF proves the ne-
cessity of ensuring that vigilant monitoring activities are
in place to discourage illegal practices.
The dynamics in the two states varied to some extent:
the two population groups were perceptibly different in
terms of their openness in providing answers, both in
the survey and in the interviews. The general impression
of acceptability of some of these sensitive practices in
Nasarawa may partly explain this diversity. However, en-
abling environments also appear to have contributed to
the differences. For example, in Nasarawa, there was a
lack of functioning DRFs in many facilities, as reported
by the health workers and key informants: this creates
opportunities for illegal practices. Ondo’s free health-
care may have had the opposite effect of reducing the
opportunities for such practices—at least for the popula-
tion groups that had access to it. The same cannot be
said for the rest of the population.
Study limitations
It is highly likely that the underreporting of medical-
related earning arrangements occurred in this study,especially with regard to predatory activities that occurred
during work hours. It is not clear how on-call services im-
pacted the normal work of health workers in this study;
such services can operate over periods of up to 24 hours a
day. If an emergency occurred when health workers were
on call while engaged in private practice, this could mean
that they could not attend their regular workplaces. It is
possible that the non-medical business practiced by 42.4%
of the respondents was also underreported. The issue of
private practice was quite a sensitive one for many respon-
dents, especially in the interview setting. One reason for
this could be that only doctors were identified as having
official permission to undertake private practice outside of
regular work hours. However, to a large extent, this did
not appear to encourage the doctors to report such acti-
vities. Many professed to be too busy with their official
work for private practice, but they were willing to talk
about their colleagues who engaged in those practices.
A combination of methods was used to tackle the sen-
sitive subject of health workers’ coping strategies. The
reticence evident among health workers and key infor-
mants in describing these activities despite the variety of
investigative tools employed indicates the challenges in
examining such sensitive issues. The health workers
were willing to participate in this study, but their apparent
distrust in the system resulted in them not being forth-
coming about their coping strategies even when they had
been assured of confidentiality. Some health workers were
interviewed outside their facilities and some were inter-
viewed within, but that did not seem to make a difference.
A further limitation of this study is the fact that it was the
health workers’ managers that put their names forward for
this survey, and encouraged them to participate. Conveni-
ence sampling was used for CHOs in Ondo and doctors
in Nasarawa, which means that some of those not re-
cruited into the study may have been absent because of
additional earning arrangements. There was no discernible
difference in the analysis between those health workers
who were randomly sampled and those recruited by con-
venience sampling.
Conclusions
This study shows that health workers’ salaries are per-
ceived as being inadequate to meet their needs because
of considerable expenditure–income asymmetry. The in-
come accrued through coping strategies to supplement
workers’ salaries was both substantial and necessary in
view of the high disparity. However, it may be difficult to
fully meet the health workers’ expenses through their
salaries and financial incentives, which emphasizes the
need for the regulation of additional earnings and targe-
ted accountability mechanisms.
The additional earning arrangements of health workers
comprised both predatory and non-predatory activities.
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and interviews because of reticence by the study popula-
tion shows that the predatory behaviors identified in this
study were only indicative. Such non-predatory strategies
as farming and trading can be regulated to ensure that
they do not conflict with the official work hours of health
workers; however, predatory mechanisms impede access
to and the quality of health-care, and they need to be dealt
with more rigorously. In general, addressing these stra-
tegies involves putting in place properly designed ac-
countability mechanisms, which in turn requires building
capacity in human resource management. In essence, per-
formance management structures have to be implemented
to ensure efficiency.
This study displays the value of using mixed methods
in investigating sensitive issues. More studies of this type
need to be carried out using mixed methods for triangu-
lation purposes to provide better insight into problems
in the health sector.
Endnotes
aAll of the tertiary health facilities in both states of-
fered specialized care but none was a teaching hospital.
bIt is usually used in surveys dealing with sensitive is-
sues, including drug use and cheating [1]. Many poten-
tial respondents in research investigating sensitive issues
refuse to answer or provide false answers. With the RRT,
because their answers are guaranteed to be private, re-
spondents are supposed to be more encouraged to an-
swer truthfully, but the RRT has had limited success in
achieving this. Its main value, however, is in identifying
those who give improbable answers; that is, the reticent
respondents [2]. The procedure:
Step 1: The respondent was given a coin as the chosen
randomization device.
Step 2: The respondent was faced with a sensitive
question.
Step 3: The respondent flipped the coin without
showing it to the interviewer; if the coin landed on
heads then the respondent was supposed to answer
“yes” to the question. If the coin landed on tails, then
the respondent was to answer truthfully to the
question.
1Londino G, Waung C. How to ask sensitive questions
using statistics: a case study of academic dishonesty. B.S
Undergraduate Mathematics Exchange. 2004;2:1.
2Omar A, Murrell P. Identifying Reticent Respondents:
Assessing the Quality of Survey Data on Corruption and
Values. Economic Development and Cultural Change,
University of Chicago Press. 2009;57:2.
cAt the time of the study, the official exchange rate for
1 dollar was 154 Naira.Additional file
Additional file 1: Table S1. Total household expenditure as a
percentage of the salary of the health workers. Table S2. Selling
drugs as an additional earning arrangement. Table S3. Prevalence of
sensitive coping strategies as assessed by the RRT according to
health worker type.
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